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DISCOVERY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,' the Unites States Supreme Court im-
posed a duty upon trial courts to protect a defendant's constitu-
tional interest in a trial untainted by prejudicial publicity.2 The
Court reversed a criminal conviction in Sheppard because massive,
pervasive, and prejudicial publicity had prevented the defendant
from receiving a fair trial. Several procedures suggested by the
Court could prevent or mitigate such prejudicial publicity; these
methods include a change of venue, postponement, searching ques-
tioning of prospective jurors, emphatic and clear instructions on
the sworn duty of each juror, sequestration of jurors, and control of
sources of information. 3 As a result of Sheppard, judicial activism
to ensure a fair trial has increased. Trial courts were compelled, not
merely encouraged, to impose restrictions on the first amendment
interests of parties, counsel, other officers of the court, and ulti-
mately, on the press.4 Considering this escalation of the existing fair
trial-first amendment controversy,5 the Supreme Court squarely
addressed the free press impact of judicial restraining orders in
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.6 In reaffirming the import-
ance of traditional first amendment protection the Court severely
limited those occasions when a restraint directed at the press could
be imposed.7 Nebraska Press, however, failed to address the issue
of the validity of restraints imposed upon the parties and their
counsel that proscribe extrajudicial statements whose publication
could be prejudicial to a fair trial.
In In re Halkin,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia considered this issue in the specific context of a
1. 384 U.S..333 (1966).
2. "The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes
from prejudicial outside interferences." Id. at 363.
3. Id. at 353, 357-62.
4. TwENTmrH CENTURY FUND, TASK FoRcE ON JUSTICE, PUBLICITY, AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT:. RIGHTS IN CONF.ICr 71-72 (1976).
5. See id. at 47.
6. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
7. The Court in Nebraska Press articulated a three-part, ad hoc test to be applied before
a restraint on the press could be justified. Such a restraint will succeed only if: (1) pretrial
publicity is likely to be so pervasive that it probably will have a prejudicial effect; (2) none
of the alternative measures recommended in Sheppard will prevent prejudice; and (3) the
restraint probably will be effective. 427 U.S. at 562-67.
8. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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protective order9 entered by the district court prohibiting public
disclosure of information obtained through discovery 10 The princi-
pal issues in Halkin were the precise nature of first amendment
interests in material obtained through discovery and the circum-
stances that justify a protective order restraining these interests
for the protection of a fair trial. The court in Halkin concluded that
strong first amendment interests attach to material obtained
through discovery Given the implication of first amendment inter-
ests, the court predictably applied the clear precedent of Nebraska
Press, which compelled limitations on protective orders.
THE NATURE OF THE INTEREST' QUALrrY NOT REDUCED
The Halkin controversy arose amidst allegations that certain gov-
ernment agencies, principally the Central Intelligence Agency and
the National Security Agency, had violated the statutory and con-
stitutional rights of United States citizens opposed to the Vietnam
War by conducting unlawful surveillance programs." Pursuant to
rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs sought
and obtained several documents relating to Operation CHAOS, the
code name for the CIA's surveillance of domestic antiwar activi-
ties.12 The material had been purged of all matters "which the Gov-
ernment asserted would (1) impair the United States' diplomatic
and foreign relations ., or (2) reveal intelligence ., or (3)
implicate the privacy interests of third parties.' 3 Although these
domestic surveillance programs already had been the subject of
broad coverage by the media," the plaintiffs' counsel believed that
the documents contained newsworthy information not reported
previously and announced his intention to release several of the
documents.15 Defendants moved for a protective order, arguing
that public disclosure would be "prejudicial to the defendants'
right to adjudication of the issues in this civil action in an uncolored
9. FED. R. Civ. P 26(c).
10. 598 F.2d at 182 n.8.
11. Id. at 179-80. Certain common carriers also were implicated.
12. Id. at 180.
13. Id.
14. The publicity was described as an "onslaught" and "massive and concentrated." Id.
at 200-01 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 180-81.
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and unbiased climate, including a fair trial."'" The district court
entered an order restraining the plaintiffs and their counsel from
disclosing any information obtained through discovery 11 Without
identifying any findings of fact, the court concluded that disclosures
would be "contrary to the rules applicable to the conduct of litiga-
tion before [thatj Court and inconsistent with the obligations of
parties and their counsel to further the just determination of mat-
ters within its jurisdiction."'" Considering this to be unduly restric-
tive of valuable public information, plaintiffs then petitioned the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for a writ of manda-
mus vacating the district court's order."
The court of appeals was confronted with the threshold issue of
whether first amendment rights attach to material obtained
through discovery If no first amendment interests were implicated,
or if only reduced first amendment interests attached to the mate-
rial, the plaintiffs faced an overwhelming burden in their action for
mandamus. The court of appeals concluded, however, that the dis-
covery process implied neither a waiver nor a reduction of first
amendment rights, that the source from which material was ob-
tained would not reduce first amendment interests, and that first
amendment rights m material obtained through discovery could be
neither ignored nor disparaged in determining whether a protective
order would issue.
Use of Discovery and Implied Waiver of First Amendment Rights
Initially, the court concluded that parties have no first amend-
ment right of access to information generally unavailable to the
16. Id. at 181-82. The defendants' motion also relied on Local Rule 1-27(d). This rule
provides in part:
Conduct of Attorneys in Civil Cases. A lawyer shall not during [his]
investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial state-
ment, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, which a reason-
able person would expect to be disseminated by means of a public communica-
tion if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with
a fair trial.
Id. at 181 n.5.
17. Id. at 182.
18. Id.
19. Plaintiffs sought a "writ of mandamus and/or prohibition." Id. at 179. The court
considered the grounds for issuing the two writs to be indistinguishable. Id. at 179 n.1.
1979]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
publicY0 The defendants had argued that because access was not a
first amendment right but was dependent on the court's processes,
any first amendment interest in the material was waived implicitly
through use of the discovery process. 21 Prior cases could be inter-
preted to support such a theory of implied waiver. In International
Products Corp. v. Koons, 22 for example, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit considered an appeal2 3 from a district court order
sealing a deposition. The order enjoined the defendants and their
counsel from disclosing to third parties any of the testimony, docu-
ments, or writings contained in the depositions submitted to the
court concerning questionable payments to foreign officials. 24 Al-
though the Second Circuit held that the order was invalid as over-
broad,2s the decision stated:
The portion of the order which seals the deposition and
limits defendants and others in their use of information obtained
therefrom was plainly authorized by F.R. Civ Proc., 30(b), and
we entertain no doubt as to the constitutionality of a rule allow-
ing a federal court to forbid the publicizing, in advance of trial,
of information obtained by one party from another by use of the
court's processes. 26
The court, however, indicated that even in the absence of such a
20. Id. at 190, citing Pell v. Procumer, 417 U.S. 187, 834 (1974) and Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). Chief Justice Warren expressed this point in a simple example in Zemel:
There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious
argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of
unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities
to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the
country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First
Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
unrestrained right to gather information.
381 U.S. at 16-17 (emphasis supplied).
21. Cf. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 144 (1888) (court has inherent power over its own
processes to prevent abuses).
22. 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
23. The court ultimately treated the appeal as a petition for mandamus. Ordinarily, an
order entered under rule 26(c) is not appealable. In limited circumstances, however, an
appellate court may consider an appeal from a nonappealable order as a petition for manda-
mus. Id. at 407.
24. Id. at 404 n.1.
25. The Second Circuit held the order violative of first amendment rights because it re-
stricted disclosure of information obtained independent of the discovery process. Id. at 407-
08.
26. Id. at 407.
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rule, such power existed in the "inherent equitable powers of courts
of law over their own process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and
injustices. 27
Rodgers v United States Steel Corp.28 expressly interpreted
Koons to support a theory of implied waiver of first amendment
rights through the use of discovery In Rodgers, the validity of a
protective order sealing depositions was again at issue and again
was held constitutionally infirm. The court in Rodgers, however,
implicitly supported a theory of waiver.
[W]e emphasize that we need not and do not consider here
whether a protective order which prohibits parties or their coun-
sel from. disclosing information or matters obtained solely as a
result of the discovery process is ever subject to the First Amend-
ment's prohibitions. It may well be, for instance, that the
parties and counsel, by taking advantage of or a part in the dis-
covery processes, implicitly waive their First Amendment rights
freely to disclose or disseminate the information obtained
through those processes.2 1
The District of Columbia Circuit emphatically and correctly re-
jected the Rodgers analysis in Halkin, stating: "Waivers of First
Amendment rights are to be inferred only in 'clear and compelling'
circumstances."3 Certainly nothing in the Federal Rules supports
such an implied waiver of first amendment rights. To the contrary,
the presumption arises that discovery imposes no inherent limits on
the use of material thereby obtained.31 From this analysis the court
27. Id. at 407-08, quoting Gumbel v. Pitkm, 124 U.S. 131, 144 (1888).
28. 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976).
29. Id. at 1006 (emphasis supplied).
30. 598 F.2d at 189, quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967)
(plurality opinion).
31. 598 F.2d at 189. The statement continues, "absent a protective order entered 'for good
cause shown.' "Id. What constitutes good cause is the fundamental issue in Halkin. The court
further agreed with the general contention that if material is obtained through the discovery
process, one may use that material m any way that the law permits. Id. at 188, citing Leonia
Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
One leading commentator on the Federal Rules has noted that discovery proceedings gener-
ally are public proceedings. 4 MooRz's FEDzRAL PRACrICz T 26.75, at 543 n.3 (Supp. 1978).
The characterization of discovery proceedings as public proceedings assumes added signifi-
cance given the Supreme Court's decision in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430
U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam), which relied on a principle clearly set forth m Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). These cases dictate that sanctions may not be imposed
against the publication of open court proceedings. The Court in Sheppard acknowledged this
1979]
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in Halkin found nothing inherent in the system of discovery to sup-
port a theory of implied waiver. A better interpretation of the Koons
statement is that a properly drawn protective order is not necessar-
ily incompatible with the first amendment. This limited construc-
tion, accepted by the court in Halkin,32 implies no derogation of first
amendment interest in material obtained through discovery
Significance of the Source of the Material
To further buttress its conclusion that strong first amendment
rights attach to material obtained through discovery, the court in
Halkin concluded that the first amendment interest in such mate-
rial must be considered independently of the means by which it is
obtained. Accordingly, the court noted: "The inherent value of
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not turn
on how or where the information was acquired. '33 The first amend-
ment interest in the material at issue in Halkin comprised not only
the plaintiffs' interest in expression but also the public's right to
receive information about the operation of the government; there-
fore, the obtainment of information through discovery did not affect
significantly the value of that information.
That the source of material has no effect on first amendment
rights was shown in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellottj.31 In
Bellotti, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a
Massachusetts statute that prohibited business corporations from
making expenditures for the purpose of influencing referenda on any
issue not affecting materially the property, business, or assets of
those corporations.36 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
had upheld the statute by distinguishing between the first amend-
rule, stating that "there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that
transpire in the courtroom." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63. In Nebraska Press,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the conclusion that open court proceedings may not be cen-
sored. Upon consideration of a trial court order prohibiting dissemination of information
adduced in an open court hearing, the Court relied primarily upon Cox, and found such a
restriction plainly violative of settled principles. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
568 (1976).
32. 598 F.2d at 189. Accord, Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F Supp. 200, 204 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
33. 598 F.2d at 187.
34. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
35. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (1975).
36. 435 U.S. at 768 n.2.
[Vol. 21.331
19791 DISCOVERY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ment rights of natural persons and the more limited rights of a
corporation.37 Reversing the Massachusetts court, the Supreme
Court declared that the state decision had focused incorrectly on the
extent of first amendment rights of corporations and had erred in
failing to note that "[tihe constitution often protects interests
broader than those of the party seeking their vindication, The First
Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests.""
To protect societal interests, then, the issue must be framed not in
terms of the source of the information, but rather as whether the
information itself warrants first amendment protection."
The court in Halkim further asserted that first amendment protec-
tion applies even to dissemination of information obtained by theft
or in violation of a security agreement. 0 To justify the assertion that
constitutional rights attach to stolen material, the court relied on
New York Times Co. v. United States4' and Rodgers v. United
States Steel Corp.4" Although New York Times primarily was con-
cerned with whether alleged national security interests justified an
injunction prohibiting publication of material by the press, the
opinion illustrates the insignificance of the source of the material in
the determination of first amendment rights. 3 The dissenters de-
scribed the papers as "purloined," 44 obtained by unauthorized
means,45 "stolen,"" and "feloniously acquired."4 The per curiam
37. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262 (1977),
rev'd sub nom., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The Massachu-
setts court deemed these rights limited because "[tlhe liberty referred to in the [fourteenth
amendment] is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons." Id. at _ 359 N.E.2d at 1269,
quoting Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906).
38. 435 U.S. at 776.
39. Three of the dissenters in Bellotti contended that first amendment protection applied
even though the source of the expression was a corporation. They contended, however, that
"corporate expenditures lack the connection with individual self-expression" necessary
for first amendment predominance in this situation. 435 U.S. at 807 (White, J., dissenting).
In Halkin, individual expression was clearly at issue.
40. 598 F.2d 187-88.
41. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). New York Times commonly is referred to as the "Pentagon Pap-
ers" case.
42. 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976).
43. The Court held that the government had failed to meet the heavy burden of justifica-
tion for a prior restraint. 403 U.S. at 714. Prior restraints bear a heavy presumption against
their validity. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
44. 403 U.S. at 749 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 750 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
46. Id.
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opinion, however, did not refer to reduced first amendment rights
in the stolen material. Instead, the Court dealt with the issue of
whether the asserted countervailing interest would justify a re-
straint on publication; it thereby implied that the stolen character
of the material would have no effect upon first amendment rights.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Rodgers expressly
adopted this reading of New York Times. The district court had
entered a protective order sealing a deposition and restricting dis-
semination of other material. Mandamus was requested from the
Third Circuit on the ground that the protective order was a prior
restraint in violation of first amendment rights. The protective
order was defended on the basis that some of the material had been
stolen. Relying directly on New York Times, the Third Circuit re-
jected this argument, stating that "[e]ven if, as respondents con-
tend, [the material] were stolen, and we express no opinion on this,
.that fact would not dictate a different result. 4 8
A contrary view of the nature of the first amendment interest in
stolen material was suggested by the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson.4" Liberty
Lobby, a political action organization, sought an injunction pro-
hibiting dissemination of allegedly stolen information. 0 The court
concluded that an injunction would not issue because no clear show-
ing of an unlawful taking had been made. Implicit in the decision
was the intimation that a showing of theft would dictate a different
result. Neither the Third Circuit in Rodgers nor the Supreme Court
in New York Times5' discussed Libert Lobby in reaching their deci-
sions. Perhaps courts should interpret Liberty Lobby to suggest
that, although the stolen character of the material does not affect
whether first amendment rights attach, it may affect the weight of
countervailing interests in determining whether the court should
47. Id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Although the concurring opinions avoided reference
to the papers as stolen, Justice Harlan accurately acknowledged "the seemingly uncontested
facts that the documents were purloined from the Government's possession and that the
newspapers received them with knowledge that they had been feloniously acquired." Id.
48. 536 F.2d at 1008 n.16.
49. 390 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
50. Liberty Lobby, a political lobbying organization, sought an injunction against defen-
dants Pearson and Anderson, publishers of the newspaper column Washington Merry-Go-
Round, prohibiting further publication of information wrongfully removed from Liberty
Lobby's files by a former employee. Id. at 490.
51. Justice Harlan alone suggested comparison. 403 U.S. at 754 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
[Vol. 21:331
DISCOVERY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
restrict first amendment rights. The court in Liberty Lobby may
have foreshadowed this conclusion in stating that " [u]pon a proper
showing the wide sweep of the First Amendment might conceivably
yield to an invasion of privacy and deprivation of rights of property
in private manuscripts. '5 2
Similarly, no derogation of first amendment interests results
when material is obtained in violation of an express security agree-
ment. Clear justification for this conclusion was presented in United
States v. Marchetti."3 Victor Marchetti had been an employee of the
CIA for nearly fourteen years and had held various positions, in-
cluding Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director. Upon com-
mencement of his employment, Marchetti signed a security agree-
ment pledging never to divulge any classified information; he signed
a similar agreement when he resigned. Following his resignation,
Marchetti published a book and a magazine article, and made ap-
pearances on television and radio shows, all of which related some-
what to his former employment. When in 1972 Marchetti wrote
another magazine article intended for publication, the United
States obtained an injunction prohibiting its publication on the
ground that classified material was included in the article. An in-
junction was granted by the district court and affirmed by the CQurt
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The security agreement notwith-
standing, Marchetti's first amendment rights were considered
clearly at issue. As the Fourth Circuit succinctly stated, "Marchetti
by signing a secrecy agreement did not surrender his First
Amendment right of free speech. The agreement is enforceable only
because it is not a violation of those rights. '5 4
First, amendment rights thus were not reduced even though the
material was obtained in violation of a security agreement. The
premise that the source of information does not affect first amend-
ment interest, as drawn from these cases and as applied by the court
in Halkin, is well supported. If first amendment protection attaches
to stolen material or material obtained in violation of a security
agreement, then first amendment.interest doubtless remains in
material legitimately obtained through the use of discovery The
plaintiffs' reliance upon the process of discovery in Halkin did not
52. 390 F.2d at 491.
53. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
54. 466 F.2d at 1317.
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derogate their interest in dissemination of the material or society's
interest in the information.
Rejection of the "Bitter-with-the-Sweet" Analysis
The final justification offered by the court in Halkin supporting
the first amendment interest in discovery material in essence was a
rebuttal to the argument offered in the dissent by Judge Wilkey
The dissent postulated a qualitative difference between the first
amendment interests in dissemination of discovery materials and
other kinds of information55 because the access to discovery material
depends not on the first amendment but on the statutory scheme
provided by the Federal Rules.56 Judge Wilkey noted an anomaly in
the majority opinion: although discovery may be denied completely
without violating first amendment protection, after access has been
obtained, any restriction on dissemination would require first
amendment consideration.5 7 Moreover, the dissent asserted that a
recipient's interest in discovery material is analogous to the prop-
erty interest of an individual in a government job addressed by the
Supreme Court in Arnett v Kennedy 18 The dissent in Halkin
adopted expressly the statement of Justice Rehnquist in his dissent
in Arnett, that any interest in a benefit conferred by the discretion
of the government could be made conditional on any limitation
attending that grant. 9 Consequently, because access to the material
at issue in Halkin depended on the Federal Rules, the Federal Rules
alone governed the limits a court could place on the use of material
obtained through discovery
As persuasive as this argument seems, it was rejected by the
majority in Halkin as it had been by a majority of the Supreme
Court in Arnett. 0 The court relied upon the principle enunciated in
Perry v. Sinderman"i that
even though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him that
55. 598 F.2d at 202-03 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
56. See note 21 supra & accompanying text.
57. 598 F.2d at 208-09 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
58. 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion).
59. 598 F.2d at 207 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
60. 416 U.S. at 177-78 (White, J., concurring in part).
61. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely It may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests-espectally, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his con-
stitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of
those freedoms would in effect be penalized or inhibited. This
would allow the government to "produce a result which [it]
could not command directly" Such interference with constitu-
tional rights is impermissible. 2
Consequently, although conditions on discovery may be imposed, 3
these conditions may not compel a waiver of first amendment rights
or justify a court's disregard of constitutionally imposed protection.
The source of first amendment protection is the Constitution; when
applying the Federal Rules, courts must consider the constitutional
protection attached to material obtained through discovery.
THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE HALKIN TEST
The conclusion that first amendment protection attached to ma-
terial obtained through discovery proved to be a mere starting point
for the more practical question of what circumstances would justify
restraints on dissemination. The Supreme Court in Near v.
Minnesota"' declared resolutely that first amendment rights are not
absolute and that circumstances might require limitation of those
rights. The court in Halkin identified this principle in previous cases
that had found that a properly drawn protective order could survive
constitutional scrutiny 65 These cases, however, provided little gnd-
ance for determining when the requisite conditions justifying re-
striction of first amendment rights were present. Halkin is signifi-
cant in its attempt to provide a framework for determining the
validity of any particular protective order, inhibiting first amend-
ment rights. The court proposed three criteria for evaluation of such
restrictions: "the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial
and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and pre-
62. Id. at 597 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
63. FED. R. Civ. P 26(c).
64. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
65. 598 F.2d at 189. See Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242, 249 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 880 (1977); International Prod. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963); Reliance
Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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cise; and, there must be no alternative means of protecting the
public interest which intrudes less directly on expression."" Fur-
thermore, "the trial court must make the necessary findings on each
element of the standard." 7 The strictness of the test is apparent;
the court in Halkin nevertheless determined that the Constitution
demands no less.
Protectwe Orders as Paradigmatic Prior Restraints
The plaintiffs in Halkin sought to characterize the protective
order as a prior restraint on expression."s Although Near v.
Minnesota clearly asserted that prior restraints are not unconstitu-
tional per se, Near also indicated that the core of first amendment
protection is the limitation of prior restraints to exceptional cases."
First amendment protection is especially sensitive to prior restraints
because "prior restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights."70 Consequently, any prior restraint bears a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity 71
Protective orders, as regarded by the court in Halkin, possess
many of the characteristics of prior restraints. Such protective
66. 598 F.2d at 191 (footnotes omitted).
67. Id. at 192.
68. The classic system of prior restraint prevents communication rather than relying on a
subsequent punishment to deter expression. Prior restraint procedure, however, also includes
subsequent punishment in the form of contempt proceedings. See Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931). See generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 J.L. & CONTEMP.
PRO. 648 (1955).
69. 283 U.S. at 713. The Court in Near went so far as to state possible exceptions:
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction
to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or
the number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary require-
ments of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security
of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence
and the overthrow by force of orderly government.
Id. at 716 (footnotes omitted). Although these examples are not exclusive, the clear import
is that exceptions will lie only in exceptional circumstances. The Court consistently has
maintained this high level of constitutional protection. For example, in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the Court found the principles of Near "universally
accepted." Id. at 557.
70. 427 U.S. at 559. Prior restraints are the least tolerable because of the immediate and
irreversible sanction. If subsequent punishment chills, prior restraint freezes. Id., citing A.
BICKEL, THE MoRALrry OF CONi'r 61 (1975).
71. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). Accord, Nebraska Press, 427
U.S. at 558; Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968).
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orders could have an even greater chilling effect on first amendment
rights through the operation of the collateral bar rule. This rule
states that a court order must be obeyed until set aside and a viola-
tion may not be defended on the ground that the order is unconstitu-
tional. A clear example of the operation of the rule is Walker v. City
of Birmingham.12 In Walker, city officials sought and obtained an
injunction against several individuals and two organizations, en-
joining them from, among other things, participating in or encour-
aging street parades without a permit as required by a city ordi-
nance. No attempt was made to have the injunction set aside; the
participants in a civil rights march knowingly violated it. Several
of the marchers were fined and sentenced to five days in jail for
violation of the injunction, 3 and the Supreme Court of Alabama
affirmed their convictions.74 The United States Supreme Court also
affirmed,7 5 adopting the Alabama Supreme Court's ruling that one
''may not raise the question of [an order's] unconstitutionality on
appeal from a judgment of conviction for contempt of the order."7
In a subsequent case, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,7 7 the
Supreme Court refused to uphold a conviction based on violation of
the ordinance involved in Walker, and held that the ordinance was
void on its face. The affirmance in Walker thus illustrates the harsh-
ness of the collateral bar rule; an unconstitutional ordinance may
be the basis for a valid court order. The chilling of first amendment
rights is apparent. Although the court in Halkin declined to deter-
mine whether the collateral bar rule could be applied constitution-
ally to the protective order at issue, the uncertainty of its applica-
tion is, in itself, a substantial chill.78
The inapplicability of the collateral bar rule, however, would not
render the characterization of the protective order as a prior re-
straint inappropriate. At least three other factors increase the prob-
ability that a protective order would be a more serious restriction
on first amendment interests than would a subsequent criminal
72. 388 U.S. 307 (1967). But see United States v. Dickenson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
73. 388 U.S. at 311-12.
74. 279 Ala. 53, 181 So. 2d 493 (1966), aff'd, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
75. 388 U.S. at 321 (1967).
76. 388 U.S. at 319-20, citing Fields v. City of Fairfield, 273 Ala. 588, 143 So. 2d 177 (1962),
rev'd on other grounds, 375 U.S. 248 (1963).
77. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
78. 598 F.2d at 184 n.15.
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punishment. Contempt proceedings may not include the same pro-
cedural protections as attend criminal prosecutions. The most nota-
ble distinction is the right to trial by jury Other distinctions include
the "presumption of innocence, the heavier burden of proof ., the
stricter rules of evidence, the stronger objection to vagueness,
[and] the immeasurably tighter and more technical procedure"7"
that attend a criminal prosecution. In addition, a judicial order
focuses on a particular individual, thereby increasing the possibility
of punishment"0 and the likelihood of self-censorship.8' Finally, the
violation of any order "strikes sharply at the status of the [court],
whose prestige thus becomes involved and whose power must be
vindicated."8
A protective order entered in accordance with rule 26(c), however,
need not present the strict restraint on expression characteristic of
a prior restraint. Comparison with the injunction in Walker, the
nature of which approached more closely the classic prior restraint,
is illustrative. Although the order in Walker was based on an ordi-
nance of suspect constitutionality, 3 the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure have survived at least cursory judicial and legislative scru-
tiny 84 Furthermore, rules such as Local Rule 1-27(d)8" which pro-
hibit extrajudicial statements by counsel, have survived constitu-
tional inspection. Finally, the Supreme Court in Nebraska Press
79. Emerson, supra note 68, at 657.
80. L. TRIe, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 726 n.2 (1978).
81. Kalven, Foreward: Even When a Nation is at War, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 34 n.156 (1971).
Professor Kalven observed this phenomenon in New York Times, in which the newspapers
indicated apparent willingness to obey an order but were not deterred subsequently by the
possibility of criminal sanctions.
82. Emerson, supra note 68, at 660.
83. See note 77 supra & accompanying text.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
85. See note 16 supra.
86. The court in Halkin declined to address the constitutionality of this rule. The rule
prohibits dissemination if there is a "reasonable likelihood" that dissemination will interfere
with a fair trial. See note 16 supra. The reasonable likelihood standard may not provide
sufficient protection for expression. In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court implied support
for the reasonable likelihood test when it reaffirmed the Sheppard v. Maxwell mandate that
trial courts must act affirmatively to ensure a fair and impartial trial "where there is a
reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to a trial will prevent a fair trial." 427 U.S.
at 553, quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (emphasis supplied). The
reasonable likelihood test has been adopted expressly by some courts. See, e.g., United States
v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); Central S.C.
Chapter, Soc. of Professional Journalists v. Martin, 431 F Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.S.C.), aff'd
with qualification, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
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indicated that such a restraint on parties and counsel may be an
acceptable, less intrusive means of ensuring a fair trial by prevent-
iug prejudicial publicity 87
The most significant distinction between the order in Walker and
a prbtective order may be the scope of the restriction. s The injunc-
tion in Walker restrained."agents, members, employees, servants,
followers, attorneys, successors, and all other persons in active con-
cert with the respondents from engaging in, sponsor-
ing, inciting or encouraging mass street parades ., trespass[ing]
. congregating ., or performing acts calculated to cause
breaches of the peace." 9 Such an overbroad and vague order is
suspect immediately A protective order under rule 26(c) however,
presents an opportunity for avoiding these weaknesses. In the
Halkin context, the district court could have considered each docu-
ment individually. Moreover, unlike the ex parte injunction in
Walker, the determination of the appropriateness of a protective
order could be made in an adversary proceeding. 0
By relying on these distinctions in authority, breadth, and preci-
sion, the court in Halkin carefully avoided classifying the protective
order as a prior restraint and thereby circumvented the "almost
insurmountable presumption against the validity of this order."'"
Other courts have concluded that reasonable likelihood provides insufficient protection;
only a serious and imminent threat justifies a restraint. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); CBS, Inc. v.
Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1975). The serious and imminent standard has been
endorsed by the American Bar Association. ABA PRoJEcT ON STANDARDS FOR CRMINAL JUS-
TICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 3 (2d ed. Tent. Draft, 1978).
The Court in Halkmn declined to express a preference for either standard. It did require,
however, a "concrete and specific showing of the likelihood of harm" before a protective order
could issue. 598 F.2d at 193 n.42. On its face, this test intimates an inclination toward the
serious and imminent standard.
87. 427 U.S. at 564.
88. The broad sweep of a restriction has proven a fatal flaw in court orders prohibiting
forms of expression. See, e.g., Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. 539, 545 (1976) (enjoining the report-
ing of other facts "strongly implicative" of a defendant); Rodgers v. United States Steel
Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1006-07 (3d Cir. 1976) (preventing dissemination of all information,
independent of source); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 1975) (restricting all
parties concerned with litigation).
89. 388 U.S. at 322 (Appendix A).
90. The Court in Halkin criticized ex parte orders and endorsed the participation of both
parties in in camera proceedings. 598 F.2d at 194 & n.43. See Kerr v. United States Dist.
Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1976); Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242, 251, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 880 (1977).
91. 598 F.2d at 186. See note 71 supra & accompanying text.
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The court's resolution of the prior restraint question, however, was
not dispositive of the issue of validity On the contrary, because the
order posed many of the dangers of a prior restraint, close scrutiny
still was required to determine if first amendment protection had
been violated.2
The Test in Halkrn
After the court in Halktn determined that substantial first
amendment interests attach to material obtained through the dis-
covery process, and that the nature of restraint posed by a rule 26(c)
protective order compelled close constitutional scrutiny, little doubt
remained as to the ultimate disposition of the protective order at
issue. The order was unaccompanied by findings of fact, a fatal flaw
under the Halkin standard.93 The merit of the decision in Halkin,
however, lies not in the vacating of the order of the district court, "4
but in the provision of a contextual framework to assist district
courts in shaping future protective orders to meet constitutional
standards. The tripartite test offered is clear, reasonable, and flexi-
ble; furthermore, the test does not conflict with the Federal Rules,
but complements the rules by guiding district courts in the determi-
nation of whether the requisite "good cause" for granting a protec-
92. 598 F.2d at 186. The opinion refers to Justice Frankfurter's admonition about prior
restraints in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). In Kingsley Books, the Court
upheld a state obscenity statute providing for confiscation of material following a final judg-
ment on the obscenity of the material. In response to the assertion that the statute constituted
an unlawful prior restraint, Justice Frankfurter observed, "[tihe phrase 'prior restraint' is
not a self-wielding sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test." Id. at 441. Although the
statute may have been a prior restraint, such a characterization was not fatal to the statute's
validity per se; rather, an analysis of whether the particular material at issue could be
restrained still was required. The court in Halkin asserted the converse of this premise; failure
to characterize a restriction as a prior restraint does not obviate the need for a pragmatic
assessment of the constitutional validity of the restriction.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248-49 (7th Cir. 1975). In a challenge to the
validity of a local court rule prohibiting extrajudicial statements by counsel, the Seventh
Circuit relied on the holding in In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971), and declared that
the rule was not a prior restraint. Close scrutiny nevertheless was required to determine the
validity of the rule.
93. See note 67 supra & accompanying text.
94. Mandamus, in fact, did not issue; the order was not vacated technically. Instead, the
court transmitted a copy of the decision to the district court for appropriate proceedings. The
defendants were not precluded from seeking a new protective order in accordance with the
principles of Halkin. 598 F.2d at 200.
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tive order is present . 5 Substantively, as discussed earlier, the test
provides that after a finding that a requested protective order ac-
tually would restrain expression, the district court must evaluate
any contemplated restriction according to three criteria: the harm
posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the re-
straining order must be drawn as narrowly as possible; no alterna-
tive means of protecting the countervailing interest that intrude less
directly on first amendment rights can be available." Furthermore,
the district court must make specific findings of fact on each ele-
ment of the test."
As support for its test, the court in Halkim relied on a series of
landmark Supreme Court cases9 which analyzed judicial restric-
tions on first amendment rights. The surest aid proved to be
Nebraska Press Associatwn v. Stuart. 9" Nebraska Press, like Halkin,
focused on the fundamental fair trial-first amendment conflict, but
in the context of a sensational murder trial. In 1975, the local police
in a small Nebraska town discovered the six members of the Henry
Kellie family murdered, with attendant signs of necrophilia. The
crime attracted widespread local and national media coverage. Two
days following the arrest of Edwin Charles Simants, the suspected
murderer, Simants' attorney joined the prosecution in seeking an
order from the county court restricting pretrial publicity to ensure
the impanelling of an impartial jury An order was granted prohibit-
ing public dissemination of any testimony or evidence adduced dur-
ing an open preliminary hearing. The following day, a group of
media representatives intervened in the Nebraska district court and
requested that the injunction against dissemination be lifted. The
district court rejected the request but held the restraint to be effec-
tive only until a jury was impanelled.'" The media group then
sought expedited relief from the Supreme Court of Nebraska, and
after five days of inaction by that court, sought a stay from Justice
Blackmun. Justice Blackmun granted a partial stay,'"' thereby fur-
ther limiting the restriction. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court
95. FED. R. Civ. P 26(c).
96. See note 66 supra & accompanying text.
97. Id. at 192.
98. Id. at 191 nn.33-36.
99. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
100. Id. at 543-44.
101. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S: 1327 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice, 1975).
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of Nebraska acted and the protective order again was limited. By
this time, the order restricted reporting of only three matters: con-
fessions and admissions made by the defendant to law enforcement
officials; confessions or admissions made to any third parties except
members of the press; and other facts "strongly implicative" of the
accused."0 2 This order, thrice limited, was struck down by a unani-
mous United States Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, categorized the order
as a prior restraint 10 3 and, relying on Near v Minnesota'0 4 and
Patterson v. Colorado,'5 reaffirmed that the principles embodied in
the first amendment weigh strongly against prior restraints. Rather
than merely stating that the order at issue failed to fall within one
of the categories of Near which justify the imposition of a prior
restraint, the Court turned to the test espoused by Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Dennis. 0 A court must determine whether
"the gravity of evil," discounted by its probability, justifies such
invasion as is necessary to avoid the danger. 107 Clearly, the protec-
tive order in Nebraska Press was not per se invalid under this stan-
dard, but required a contextual analysis to determine if the order
could withstand constitutional challenge. In its analysis of the
order, the Court set forth a test for determining the validity of an
order restraining the press. First, the probable extent of pretrial
publicity must be determined, and the trial court must conclude
that the publicity will affect adversely jurors or prospective jurors. 0l
In addition, less restrictive alternatives for dealing with the problem
must be deemed ineffectual. The alternatives suggested were
102. 427 U.S. at 545.
103. Id. at 556.
104. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
105. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
106. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), affl'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
107. 183 F.2d at 212. This test was adopted expressly by the Supreme Court in its affirm-
ance. 341 U.S. at 510. Until Nebraska Press, however, the Dennis test was used to determine
the validity of a subsequent-punishment type of restriction. For a brief criticism of this test
and its application in the Nebraska Press prior restraint context, see Schmidt, Nebraska
Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv.
431, 458 (1977).
108. 427 U.S. at 562. The Court determined that the trial judge could conclude reasonably,
"based on human experience," that pretrial publicity would be pervasive and that the public-
ity might affect adversely potential jurors. Id. at 563. The trial judge determined only that
this publicity "could impinge upon the defendant's right to a fair trial;" therefore, his conclu-
sion "was of necessity speculative." Id. (emphasis original).
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adopted from Sheppard v. Maxwell and included change of venue,
postponement, searching voir dire, emphatic and clear instructions
to the jurors, and possible sequestration of jurors after they have
been impanelled.'10 Finally, the court must concude that the re-
straint imposed will be effective.""0
The test proposed in Halkin is similar to the Nebraska Press
standard. The first requirement in Halkin was that the harm posed
by dissemination must be substantial and serious. To justify this
requirement, the court relied not only on Nebraska Press and Judge
Hand's test in Dennis, but also on a principle drawn from a line of
cases beginning with Bridges v. California"' and reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court recently in Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia. 2 This principle asserts that, before a court can use its
contempt power to punish an out-of-court statement, "the substan-
tive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high."" 3 The harm posed must be more than probable;
"it must immediately imperil." ' The reaffirmance of this principle
in Landmark Communications indicates that this requirement is
well founded.
The second and third requirements imposed by Halkin, that any
order be as precise as possible and that less restrictive alternatives
by unavailable, seem equally well founded. Halkin merely bifur-
109. Id. at 563-64, citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966). The Court
suggested that restraints on parties, counsel, police and witnesses might be an acceptable,
less intrusive alternative to direct restraints on the press. Id. The court, however, admonished
that mere exposure of jurors to pretrial publicity alone does not prejudice presumptively a
defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 565, quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799
(1975).
The speculative nature of the effectiveness of alternatives has led one commentator to
assert that alternatives at least must be tried before a restraint on expression could be found
valid. See L. TRIBE, supra note 80. Another commentator has stated that "the practical
impact of the rule announced [in Nebraska Press] is to outlaw all prior restraints in
the fair trial/free press cases." Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The Practical Effect on Gag
Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REv. 497, 497-98 (1977).
Alth6ugh this statement is probably overbroad, Nebraska Press may be interpreted safely as
comporting with the Near principle that restraints must be limited to exceptional cases. See
note 70 supra & accompanying text.
110. 427 U.S. at 565.
111. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Accord, Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
112. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
113. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 263.
114. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1946).
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cated the less restrictive alternative portion of the Nebraska Press
standard. The fundamental principle, however, remains clear; when
a restriction on first amendment rights is contemplated, the court
must ensure that the restriction imposes the least limitation on the
rights of expression necessary to protect the countervailing justify-
ing interest. Support for this principle is stated clearly in Carroll v.
Princess Anne:"' "An order issued in the area of First Amendment
rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish
the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate.""16
Thus, the Halkin requirement that the possibility of alternatives
with less severe impact on first amendment rights must be investi-
gated merely restates the more general principle of Carroll that
restrictions be as narrow as possible.
Two major distinctions between Nebraska Press and Halkin, how-
ever, appear to weaken the Halkin analysis that so strongly relied
upon Nebraska Press. First, the Court in Nebraska Press was influ-
enced by its classification of the protective order as a prior restraint
and by the belief that prior restraints are the least tolerable infringe-
ment on first amendment rights."7 The order in Halkin was not
characterized as a prior restraint; consequently, the strong pre-
sumption against the order's validity was avoided."' The second
distinction lies in the different targets of the restraint. In Nebraska
Press, the press was restricted; in Halkin, the persons restricted
were the parties and their counsel. The Court in Nebraska Press
strongly implied that restrictions on lawyers, parties, police, and
witnesses would be an acceptable, less intrusive alternative to a
restraint on the press."9 Three justices, in concurrence, expressly
115. 393 U.S. 175 (1968). Carroll concerned an injunction restraining a "white suprema-
cist" group from holding a public rally. The Supreme Court held the injunction invalid
because it was obtained by an ex parte proceeding. Absent a showing of unavailability of the
adverse party, an adversary proceeding was required to ensure protection of first amendment
interests.
116. Id. at 183. A similar result was reached by the Court more recently in Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). The Court in Procunter considered prison mail censorship
regulations. Holding that the regulations were void for vagueness and violative of due process,
the Court asserted that any restriction of first amendment rights would be invalid if unneces-
sarily broad. "[Tihe limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Id.
at 413.
117. 427 U.S. at 559.
118. See note 71 supra & accompanying text.
119. See 427 U.S. at 553-54: "[nJeither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused,
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endorsed control of statements to the media by counsel and wit-
nesses, stating: "[i]t is very doubtful that the court would not have
the power to control release of information by these individuals in
appropriate cases and to impose suitable limitations whose
transgressions could result in disciplinary proceedings.""'2 Further-
more, the concurring opinion rejected application of the Nebraska
Press three-part test for determining the validity of an order.
Rather, the concurrence asserted that the order involved was a prior
restraint, that it failed to fall within the exceptional circumstances
requirement of Near v. Minnesota,2' and that no reason justified
expanding the Near exceptions.' 2 Consequently, the majority's
analysis or proposed test was unnecessary Justice White, in a sepa-
rate concurrence, approached this position by expressing grave
doubt that such a prior restraint on the press to protect a fair trial
ever could be justified. 12 Thus, four members of the Court expressed
disagreement with the ad hoc balancing test in Nebraska Press.
The above considerations need not weigh against the constitu-
tional standard and its application proposed in Halkin. Although
Halkin involves parties and counsel rather than the press, the pro-
posed test does not conflict with Nebraska Press; to the contrary,
the tests are complementary Although the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the special role of the press in informing and educating the
public, 2 14 "the press does not have a monopoly on either the First
Amendment or the ability to enlighten.' 2 5 Chief Justice Burger,
witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers should be permitted to frustrate Ithe
administration of justice]." Id., quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 363. Although the
Court observed that this precise matter was not at issue, it noted reports oforganizations that
lend support to this type of restraint. 427 U.S. at 564 n.8.
120. Id. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
121. See note 69 supra.
122. In essence, Justice Brennan interpreted the three exceptional circumstances proposed
in Near as only two separtate categories: (1) speech not encompassd by the protection of the
first amendment, and (2) military emergencies. 427 U.S. at 590-91. The expression involved
in Nebraska Press, reporting on the judicial system, fit into neither of these categories. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, emphatically declined to create a new
category. Id. at 594.
123. Id. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring).
124. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 863-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
125. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 51 n.56 (1976) (per curiam); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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concurring in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, clearly re-
jected any contention that the first amendment conferred on the
press a special protection not also guaranteed to other persons and
categories.'28 Moreover, Halkin does not conflict with the Nebraska
Press proposition that restraints on parties, counsel, and witnesses
would be a preferable, less intrusive alternative to a restraint im-
posed directly on the press;"2 7 rather, Halkin is the next logical step.
The key is to focus not on "the power to control release" of informa-
tion by those individuals, but on "control[ling] release in
appropriate cases. "28 Halkin merely provides guidance in determin-
ing the presence of an appropriate case. Accordingly, as Nebraska
Press required examination of less intrusive alternatives before re-
straining the press, Halkin requires a similar examination before
restraining the first amendment rights of parties and counsel.
Although the Court in Nebraska Press considered that protective
order a prior restraint whereas the court in Halkin did not reach that
conclusion, this distinction does not vitiate the Halkmn standard.
Nebraska Press adopted the Dennis version of the clear and present
danger test, a test not associated originally with prior restraints.' 2
The result in Halkin therefore may receive stronger support, be-
cause the protective order was not a prior restraint.
Two other areas, neglected by the court in Halkin, warrant dis-
cussion. First, the Halkin test, although virtually identical to the
test in Nebraska Press, failed to incorporate the requirement that
any restraint imposed must carry an expectation of effectiveness.
The Court in Nebraska Press asserted two bases for this require-
ment: the problem of jurisdiction over persons subject to the order
could render the restraint ineffective,'30 and the absence of accu-
rate news accounts resulting from a restraint could prove counter-
126. 435 U.S. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
127. See notes 119 & 120 supra & accompanying text.
128. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied).
129. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (criminal proceeding). The
"clear and present" danger standard was articulated most recently in Landmark Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). Although the Court admonished the Supreme
Court of Virginia for its mechanical application of the test, the Court implicitly supported
the ad hoc balancing approach in the context of a subsequent restraint on expression, a state
criminal statute. Reversing the Virginia court for improperly applying the test, the Supreme
Court instructed that "[piroperly applied, the test requires a court to make inquiry into the
imminence and magnitude of the danger and then to balance the character of the evil,
as well as its likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered expression." Id. at 842-43.
130. 427 U.S. at 565-66.
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productive by enhancing the "generative propensities of rumors."'3
Although the danger posed by the latter consideration is much less
in civil discovery than in a sensational small town criminal trial, the
possibility that a protective order might not prevent dissemination
effectively is more significant. A clear example is found in Halkin,
in which no violation of the protective order entered by the district
court was shown or implied, yet the documents subject to the order
were obtained by and printed in a prominent newspaper.1 2 Further-
more, the existing protective order might not have prevented dis-
semination had an individual sought access to the documents
through a Freedom of Information Act request.' Finally, the docu-
ments could have been filed with the pleadings, thereby rendering
them public records and thus open to general inspection and dis-
semination. 34 These examples illustrate that if the practical effec-
tiveness of a restraint was a valid consideration in Nebraska Press,
it should be an equally valid component of the Halkin standard.
The court in Halkin may have considered effectiveness insignifi-
cant, because practical effectiveness was not dispositive in Halkim
and was supported weakly in Nebraska Press. An analysis of practi-
cal effectiveness, however, could prove valuable in future applica-
tions of Halkin, and should not be ignored.
Finally, the protective order in Halkin could have been found
invalid without the articulation of a new constitutional standard or
its application. Although the district court cannot be criticized for
failing to apply a then nonexistent standard, the protective order
contained other serious flaws. First, overbreadth of a restraint had
been established as clear justification for appellate courts to vacate
similar orders, 35 and the protective order in Halkin appeared over-
broad on its face. The order was based substantially on Local Rule
1-27(d). 13 That rule, however, applies only to extrajudicial state-
ments by counsel and therefore provides no justification for restrain-
ing expression of parties. Also, the order was entered absent the
131. Id. at 567.
132. 598 F.2d at 182.
133. This possibility was acknowledged by the dissent in Halkin: "Presumably, plaintiffs
could also obtain these materials through the FOIA." Id. at 207 n.30 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
134. See note 31 supra.
135. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976); CBS,
Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970);
International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
136. 598 F.2d at 182 n.8.
19791
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
showing of good cause required by the Federal Rules.' 7 The Halkin
test provides a more comprehensive definition for good cause when
first amendment interests are implicated. Even before this test had
been proposed, however, good cause required "a particular and spe-
cific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and
conclusory statements.""'3 In Halkin, the defendants had moved for
a protective order on the bald assertion that public disclosure would
be prejudicial to a fair trial. '39 The controversy certainly had been
the subject of broad media coverage and the disclosure of the pro-
tected documents could be expected to receive substantial atten-
tion. Nevertheless, the defendants claimed no anticipation of in-
creased harm from the release of these particular documents, and
the district court did not indicate that the imminence of such spe-
cific harm was presumed.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional analysis in Halkin may have resulted from a
feeling by the court that mandamus would be more appropriate
than a later appeal to protect precious constitutional rights.'45 Al-
though its constitutional analysis arguably was unnecessary, the
court's desire to guide district courts faced with similar controver-
sies was understandable. After a thorough treatment of the issues,
the court reached a proper conclusion. The plaintiffs had an interest
in the material obtained through discovery that warranted first
amendment protection. In addition, the protective order could not
withstand constitutional scrutiny The court provided a reasonable,
flexible standard for resolving future first amendment-discovery
conflicts in accordance with the first amendment-fair trial princi-
ples of Nebraska Press.
The ad hoc balancing of the Halk n test is perhaps unavoidable,
considering the impracticability of any rigid system of rules when
first amendment protection is involved. Halkin does not contradict
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or portend any derogation of
137. FED. R. Civ. P 26(c).
138. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2035 (1970). See, e.g.,
Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
139. 598 F.2d 181-82.
140. Id. at 198. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962) (special
responsibility to protect constitutional right to jury trial).
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the right to a fair trial. In applying Halkin, district courts may
maintain both discretion to shape relief and to ensure protection of
the interest in fair resolution of litigation. Halkin merely requires
that first amendment interests be granted proper consideration.
K.R.V
